Three-Day Absence During COVID Lockdown Not Justification For Compulsory Retirement; Kerala HC Reinstates Railway Employee With Full Benefits

Three-Day Absence During COVID Lockdown Not Justification For Compulsory Retirement; Kerala HC Reinstates Railway Employee With Full Benefits

Pranav Kumar

26 Mar 2025 12:16 PM

Kerala High Court: A Division Bench comprising Justice Amit Rawal and Justice K.V. Jayakumar set aside the compulsory retirement of a Railway employee. As the only misconduct was unauthorized absence for three days during the pandemic, the court found the punishment to be grossly disproportionate. The court directed his immediate reinstatement with all consequential benefits, and ruled that his absence should be treated as casual leave in accordance with government COVID-related office memorandums.

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Background

Nitheesh K., employed as Technician-III under the Railways, took medical emergency leave from 16th to 18th March 2020 to visit his native place in Kerala. He subsequently requested and was granted leave extension from 19 to 21 March. On 22nd March, the government declared a general curfew to contain the COVID-19 pandemic, followed by a nationwide lockdown that continued until 2nd June 2020.

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During the lockdown period, Nitheesh remained at his native place. Eventually, on 31st July, he obtained a travel pass and reported for duty. Upon arrival, he sought regularization of his leave during the period of absence. He cited government circulars regarding the special casual leave considering COVID pandemic. The Railways rejected this request and issued a charge sheet alleging unauthorized absence from March to August 2020. Consequently, Nitheesh was penalised with compulsory retirement.

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He challenged this order before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), which found that the punishment of compulsory retirement was disproportionate. The CAT directed the Union to consider imposing a lesser punishment. Consequently, the Railways demoted him to Assistant (Workshop) Grade with pay fixed at Rs.18,000/- for 48 months. Aggrieved, Nitheesh approached the High Court.

Arguments

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Nitheesh argued that the punishment was disproportionate considering the COVID-19 pandemic. He pointed out that the workshop remained closed from 20.03.2020 to 02.06.2020, and his extended leave was only until 21.03.2020. He submitted that not being able to explain three days of absence (22nd to 24th March 2020) could not justify such severe punishment. He also submitted that similarly situated employees were granted exemptions or received lesser punishments for unexplained long absences.

The Union of India argued that unexplained absence of a government employee constitutes serious indiscipline that cannot be pardoned. While conceding that compulsory retirement might not be justified (as per the Tribunal's order), they maintained that the subsequent penalty of reduction in pay grade was appropriate.

Court's Reasoning

Firstly, the Court noted that Nitheesh was on sanctioned leave until 21.03.2020, and there was an undisputed nationwide lockdown beginning on 24.03.2020. The workshop too was closed from 20.03.2020 to 02.06.2020. In these circumstances, the Court found compulsory retirement to be disproportionate and a “wholly unjustified” punishment.

Secondly, the Court observed that the revised punishment amounted to withholding increments with cumulative effect, as it effectively takes away valuable service benefits for almost seven years. The court ruled that this too was disproportionate to the alleged misconduct.

Thirdly, the Court highlighted that Nitheesh had demonstrated his commitment by traveling 400 km during the pandemic to report for duty, after which he was advised to undergo quarantine for 14 days. The Court concluded that there was “hardly any willful absence” on Nitheesh's part that could justify such severe punishment.

Thus, the Court set aside both the compulsory retirement order and the revised punishment order. As per the Office Memorandum dated 28.07.2020, the court directed the Union to treat Nitheesh's unauthorised absence for three days as casual leave. Consequently, the court ordered his reinstatement with all benefits within one month.

Decided on: 25.02.2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:KER:16819 | Nitheesh K. v. Union of India

Counsel for the Petitioner: Mr. Martin G. Thottan and Mr. Varghese John

Counsel for the Respondents: Sri. R.V. Sreejith

'For 20 Yrs He Was Sleeping': Rajasthan High Court Rejects Govt Employee's Plea Against 2002 Penalty Stopping Yearly Increments

'For 20 Yrs He Was Sleeping': Rajasthan High Court Rejects Govt Employee's Plea Against 2002 Penalty Stopping Yearly Increments

Nupur Agrawal

25 Mar 2025 12:15 PM



Dismissing a government employee's plea challenging a penalty which stopped three annual grade increments as well as rejection of appeal and review petitions, the Rajasthan High Court observed that his plea was barred by delay of over two decades.

Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand in his order said,

"It appears that the petitioner was sleeping over the matter for more than two decades and all of sudden, he woke up after twenty years and approached this Court without giving any plausible explanation in the instant writ petition about the aforesaid inordinate delay".

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The petitioner was imposed with the penalty of stoppage of 3 annual grade increments in 2002 under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. An appeal as well as a review petition were filed against this 2002 order imposing penalty, but these were rejected in 2003 and 2004 respectively.

He then approached the high court in 2024 filing a petition challenging the original order imposing penalty as well as rejection of the appeal and the review petition against that order.

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The Court highlighted the settled position of law by making a reference to many Supreme Court decisions.

In the cases of New Delhi Municipal Council v Pan Singh and Others, as well as State of Uttaranchal and another v Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and Others it was held that irrespective of there being no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226, ordinarily it should be filed within a reasonable period. It was further held that relief to someone who put forth a stale claim could be refused on account of delay and laches because anyone sleeping over his rights was bound to suffer.

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Similarly, in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others v T.T.Murali Babu, it was held that,

“The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity… Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant “a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix.”

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In this background, the high court observed that the petitioner approached the court after a delay of almost 20 years without any satisfactory explanation for laches and delay, and law had already set its face against such indolent litigants.

Accordingly, the petition was dismissed.

Title: Sudershan v State of Rajasthan & Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 118

Government Employee Dying A Day Before 60th Birthday Is Deemed Under 60, Dependent Eligible For Compassionate Appointment : Calcutta HC

Government Employee Dying A Day Before 60th Birthday Is Deemed Under 60, Dependent Eligible For Compassionate Appointment : Calcutta HC

Namdev Singh

25 Mar 2025 1:15 PM




The Calcutta High Court bench comprising of Saugata Bhattacharyya, J. held that a government employee is deemed not to have completed 60 years of age if they die one day before their 60th birthday, therefore making their dependent eligible for compassionate appointment.

Background Facts

The petitioner applied for appointment on compassionate ground in a secondary school after death of his father. The date of birth of father was 2nd January, 1961. He turned sixty on January 1, 2021, the same day he passed away. The respondent refused the prayer of the petitioner. The reason assigned by the respondent in the memo dated 5th February, 2024 was attainment of age of sixty years by father of the petitioner on 1st January, 2021 when he died.

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The respondent decided on the basis of Schedule V of the West Bengal School Service Commission (Selection of Persons for Appointment to the Post of Non-teaching Staff) Rules, 2009 (Rules of 2009), that father of the petitioner attained sixty years on the date of his death, therefore, petitioner was not entitled to get benefit of appointment on compassionate ground.

Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed the writ petition for quashing the memo dated 5th February, 2024 issued by the Assistant Secretary, West Bengal Regional School Service Commission.

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It was contended by the petitioner that since date of birth of father of the petitioner was 2nd January, 1961 therefore, father of the petitioner did not complete sixty years on 1st January, 2021. He would have completed sixty years on 2nd January, 2021. It was further argued that, despite the petitioner's father's date of superannuation, the petitioner should have been considered an eligible candidate for appointment on compassionate grounds. It was stated that there was one day short to complete age of 60 years on the date of death, which makes the petitioner entitled to be considered for appointment on compassionate ground.

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Further petitioner relied on Rules 18 and 20 of the West Bengal Primary School Teachers Recruitment Rules, 2016. As per Rule 18, the superannuation date of father of the petitioner was 31st January, 2021. It was further submitted that Rule 20 states the financial hardship of family of deceased teacher and definition of family are to be taken into consideration in terms of Schedule V of the Rules of 2009.

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On the other hand it was contended by the respondent that Rules of 2016 was not applicable but Schedule V of Rules of 2009 was applicable while adjudging eligibility of the petitioner to be appointed on compassionate ground. Clause 1 of Schedule V of the Rules of 2009 states that date of superannuation of father of petitioner was fixed on 31st January, 2021. However, father of the petitioner attained sixty years on 1st January, 2021 which makes the petitioner disentitled in the matter of granting appointment on compassionate ground. According to the respondent authorities, date of birth of father of the petitioner was 2nd January, 1961 and he completed sixty years of age on 1st January, 2021. Therefore, petitioner was not entitled to be considered for appointment on compassionate ground.

Findings of the Court

The Clause 1 under Schedule V of the Rules of 2009 was relied upon by the court which provides that when a teacher or non-teaching staff dies in harness before the date of his superannuation that is the age of sixty years in that event only one of the family members of the deceased teacher /nonteaching staff is entitled to be considered for appointment on compassionate ground.

It was observed by the court that father of the petitioner was scheduled to retire on 31st January, 2021 but unfortunately, he died on 1st January, 2021 when his age was 59 years 11 months and 29 days. If the father would have died on 2nd January, 2021 it could have been concluded that father completed sixty years of age.

It was further observed that had father of the petitioner died on 2nd January, 2021 then son would have been adjudged being not eligible to be considered for appointment on compassionate ground. But in the present case, since father died on the last date when he attained 60th year it cannot be concluded that the father completed sixty years.

Therefore, it was held by the court that there is no bar in considering application of the petitioner seeking appointment on compassionate ground if father of the petitioner had died on the last date just before completing sixty years of age. Therefore, the memo dated 5th February, 2024 issued by the respondent was set aside by the court.

With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition was allowed.

Case Name : Sk. Monikul Hossain VS. The State of West Bengal & Ors.

Case No. : W.P.A. 28275 OF 2024

Counsel for the Petitioner : Firdous Samim, Gopa Biswas, Sampriti Saha, Swati Dey

Counsel for the Respondents : Biswabrata Basu Mallick, Biman Halder, Sunit Kumar Roy, Saibal Acharyya, Tanweer Jamil Mandal

Although MCI Regulations Allow 30% Of Faculty Positions To Be Reserved For Non-Medical Candidates In Colleges, It Is Not Mandatory: J&K High Court

Although MCI Regulations Allow 30% Of Faculty Positions To Be Reserved For Non-Medical Candidates In Colleges, It Is Not Mandatory: J&K High Court

Aleem Syeed

27 Mar 2025 4:25 PM

Clarifying the rules for recruitment in medical institutes, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court ruled that the Medical Council of India (MCI) guidelines allow for up to 30% of the total appointments in certain departments to be from non-medical faculty, but there is no legal obligation to do so.

Respondent No.1, who was a non-medical candidate, had challenged the appointment on the basis that the institute was under an obligation to appoint 30% from non-medical candidates. The court however said that the contention of Respondent No.1, challenging the appointment of a candidate belonging to the medical category was without any basis.

A bench of Justices Sanjeev Kumar, Justice Puneet Gupta made it clear that the rule referred to by Respondent No.1 was not a mandatory provision but discretionary and further observed that even if a medical institute appoints all teachers from the medical category in departments such as Anatomy, Physiology, Biochemistry, and Pharmacology, it cannot be said that the institute has violated the 30% norm laid down in the regulations.

The court noted that the posts in question were advertised in 2016, and by virtue of the said advertisement, both candidates from the medical and non-medical streams could apply. The court said that Respondent No.1 had the lowest score in the merit list, whereas Respondent No.4 had the highest marks and was accordingly selected for the post.

The court observed that in the presence of more meritorious candidates with medical qualifications, the unfilled post could not have been given to Respondent No.1, who was last in the merit list, solely on the basis that he possessed a non-medical qualification.

The court held that the contention of Respondent No.1, requiring the institute to mandatorily fill 30% of the seats from non-medical candidates, was totally misconceived and contrary to the regulations provided by the MCI.

The court ruled that the single bench had earlier operated on the wrong premise that the institute was obligated to fill 30% of posts from the non-medical category in each discipline.

The court also said that it is at the discretion of the medical institution concerned to appoint non-medical faculty in some departments, such as Pharmacology, but while doing so, the institution must ensure that the number of non-medical teachers does not exceed 30% of the total number of posts in the department.

BACKGROUND

The case revolves around the appointment of an Assistant Professor in the Department of Clinical Pharmacology at SKIMS, Srinagar. Respondent No.1 applied for the post of Assistant Professor, but Respondent No.4 was appointed to the position. Respondent No.1 challenged the selection process, arguing that SKIMS was obligated to fill 30% of faculty positions in Clinical Pharmacology with non-medical candidates as per Medical Council of India (MCI) norms.

The Single Judge of the High Court, in its judgment, directed SKIMS to reconsider his case for appointment retrospectively, prompting the appellant to file intra-court appeals.

APPEARANCE:

Jahangir Iqbal Ganai, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Junaid Malik, Advocate for Petitioners

M.Y.Bhat, Sr. Advocate with Mr. R.A.Bhat, Advocate for R-1

Abdul Rashid Malik, Sr. AAG with Ms. Rahella Khan, Advocate FOR Respondents

Case-title: Dr. Majid Farooq vs Dr. Majid Farooq, 2025

Time Is Precious, Courts Should Be Slow To Ignore Delay When Action Is Time-Barred: Madras High Court

Time Is Precious, Courts Should Be Slow To Ignore Delay When Action Is Time-Barred: Madras High Court

Upasana Sajeev

17 Mar 2025 6:00 PM

The Madras High Court has stressed that courts should be slow to ignore delay once the limitation period for a particular suit expires and the action becomes time-barred.

Justice Shamim Ahmed observed that the statute relating to limitation determines the life span of a legal remedy and as time passes, newer causes would come up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy. Remarking that time is precious, the court thus noted that if the life span of legal remedy was not followed, it may lead to unending uncertainty and anarchy.

“The statute relating to limitation determines a life span for such legal remedy for redress of the legal injury, one has suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time, newer causes would come up, necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy,” the court said.

The court was hearing a plea by Mayalagu challenging an order of the Director of Collegiate Education and to direct the authorities to give him notional promotion as Lab Assistant in VSS Government Arts College with all benefits.

Mayalagu submitted that he was initially appointed as a Sports Marker in the college. When the college intended to fill up the post of Lab Assistant with one post to be filled through direct recruitment and two posts through promotion, Mayalagu was not considered since a disciplinary proceeding had been initiated against him under Rule 17(a) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. It was informed that he had been imposed with the punishment of stoppage of increment for one year without cumulative effect.

When the same was challenged before the writ court, the court directed the college to appoint Mayalagu as lab assistant pursuant to which he was promoted by proceedings dated May 27, 2013. During the pendency of the petition, his punishment was reduced to a censure. Since censure was not a bar to get promotion, Mayalagu submitted a representation in 2013 asking the authorities to promote him with effect from 2008, the date on which two of the three posts were filled up. This representation was rejected in 2019 following which Mayalagu retired.

The respondents challenged the petition and argued that it was filed belatedly after 2 years of his retirement. It was argued that at the belated stage, granting retrospective notional promotion was not feasible as it had become time-barred.

The court noted that there was no proper and satisfactory explanation for giving a belated representation and for filing the petition 2 years after retirement. Thus, the court opined that the claim could not be sustained on the grounds of laches.

The court added that while it cannot be presumed that a delay in approaching court was always deliberate, it was necessary to show sufficient cause for the delay. The court added that the “sufficient cause” must show that the delay was not deliberate, negligent and due to the casual approach of the litigant but was Bonafide die to reasons beyond the litigant's control.

In the present case, the court was not satisfied with the explanation rendered by the litigant. The court added that the delay remained virtually unexplained and thus, the court was not inclined to exercise judicial discretion to condone the delay. The court observed that after being promoted as Lab Assistant in 2013, the petitioner kept quiet for more than five years without making any request for notional promotion which would show that he had accepted the post.

Thus, finding no reason to interfere, the court dismissed the plea.

Counsel for the Petitioner: Mr. R. Suriya Narayanan

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr. D. Sadiq Raja, Additional Government Pleader

Case Title: S. Mayalagu v. The Director of Collegiate Education and Another

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 109

Case No: WP(MD) No.6979 of 2021

'Unacceptable': Gujarat High Court Imposes ₹2 Lakh Cost On Man For Joining VC Hearing From Lavatory

'Unacceptable': Gujarat High Court Imposes ₹2 Lakh Cost On Man For Joining VC Hearing From Lavatory

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK

23 Mar 2025 9:10 AM

The Gujarat High Court has imposed a cost of Rs. 2 Lakh on a man for attending court proceedings through video conferencing from a lavatory and has further asked him to perform community service by cleaning the gardens in the high court premises for two weeks.

In doing so the court rejected the man's contention that he had used the high court's website for the first time and thus committed a mistake noting that the 42-year-old man has a B.Sc. degree, and is working in a company. The court said that it cannot be accepted from the person like him that he was not well versed with the operation of the applications, adding that the "indecent act was not only unacceptable but shameful".

Justice MK Thakker in her order said:

"The video, which was viral and thereafter report was called for from Sola Police Station to trace out the person found in the video it reveals that on 17.02.2025 at 12:20 hours one person joined the link by showing the name as “Kanubhai” and he was in indecent manner, he was disconnected. Again, he joined, as the place from where he joined was a lavatory, he was again disconnected. Thereafter, by showing the number of the matter, namely, CRA 11948/2023 the person joined again. The son of the respondent No.2 is present before the Court, namely, Dhavalbhai Kanubhai Patel is having the educational qualification of B.Sc. aged around 42 years and serving in the Reliance Group. So it cannot be accepted from the person like a present, was not wellverse with the operation of the applications. In such scenario, the indecent act is not only unacceptable but it is a shameful and is required to be strictly condemned. If Courts do not deal with such a person with strong hands then, that may result lowering the dignity of the institution in the eyes of public"

It thus imposed exemplary costs of Rs.2,00,000 on the man to be deposited with the Registry within two weeks. The court further directed him to report to the Special Officer, Dedicated Cell at 10:00a.m. and perform community service by cleaning the gardens of the High Court under the supervision of the officer for two weeks.

"The Special Officer, Dedicated Cell, shall submit a report to the Court regarding the completion of the said service," the court added. It further asked the Registry to submit if a report on deposition of the costs, and said that if costs is not paid then further action will be taken.

The incident had occured during the hearing of a plea moved by Gujarat State Co-operative Marketing Federation Limited challenging a January 21, 2023 labour court order pertaining to a dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act.

The court was informed by the counsel appearing for respondent no. 2 that his client's matter was listed on February 17 (Special Civil Application No.11948 of 2023) and therefore on "downloading the board from the High Court website and on clicking on zoom application as well as filling up password" his son had joined the online hearing.

"As it was the first time, he used the website of the High Court, such mistake was committed and therefore, he tendered his unconditional apology," the counsel said.

Meanwhile the Ahmedabad's Sola Police Station had in the previous hearing submitted a report to the court which stated that person who was found in the video, was not the person present in the Court on February 20, who is the petitioner in another petition. The report stated that the person in the video was the son of the respondent No.2 in Special Civil Application No.11948 of 2023.

The court had thus in its previous order had directed the respondent no. 2 as well as his son to be present in personally present in court on the next date of hearing.

Case title: GUJARAT STATE CO OPERATIVE MARKETING FEDERATION LIMITED v/s PRESIDENT OFFICER & ANR

Madras High Court Orders Payment Of ₹1 Lakh Cost To Office Assistant Who Was Denied Maternity Leave By Magistrate, Calls It "Inhuman"

Madras High Court Orders Payment Of ₹1 Lakh Cost To Office Assistant Who Was Denied Maternity Leave By Magistrate, Calls It "Inhuman"

Upasana Sajeev

24 Mar 2025 3:12 PM

Criticizing the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Kodavasal and the Principal District Judge, Thiruvarur for denying maternity benefit to an Office Assistant, the Madras High Court has held that when there was no dispute regarding the marriage, the employer should not seek proof beyond reasonable doubt for granting the maternity benefit.

“No doubt, Maternity Leave is granted to married woman. A marriage need not be compulsorily registered. The employer cannot seek proof beyond doubt for the factum of marriage unless it is disputed...The reliance placed on G.O.(Ms) No.84 is also ill conceived. The effect of the said G.O. is only to increase the number of days of maternity leave from 270 days to 365 days. It is the Fundamental Rules which governed grant maternity leave. No doubt, maternity leave can be availed of by a married woman only, but the employer is not expected to seek proof beyond doubt of the factum of marriage,” the court held.

The bench of Justice R Subramanian and Justice G Arul Murugan held that the action of the Magistrate was wholly unwarranted and inhumane. The bench added that when prima facie evidence was available, the Magistrate seemed to have fished for reasons and rejected the maternity leave application. Thus, the court directed the Registrar General of the Madras High Court to pay Rs. 1,00,000 to the woman for the mental agony suffered by her due to the respondents' actions.

“The action of the learned District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, to say the least is inhuman. In the days were even live in relationships are recognized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the learned District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Kodavasal, appears to have taken archaic view of the matter and has fished for and found out reasons for rejection of the application of the petitioner. This, in our opinion, is wholly unwarranted,” the court directed.

The order was made in a petition filed by B Kavitha, Office Assistant of the Magistrate. Kavitha lost her first husband on January 2020. After this, she fell in love with one Bharathi and married him on April 28, 2024. When Kavitha applied for a maternity leave on October 18, 2024, her application was rejected on mainly three grounds. Firstly, that the marriage was not registered. Secondly, that an FIR lodged against Bharathi for cheating on false promise of marriage could not be treated as proof of marriage and third that the pregnancy was prior to the marriage. Claiming that maternity leave could be claimed only by a married woman, the Magistrate dismissed the petition.

The High Court was not inclined to accept this view. Though the court agreed that maternity leave is granted only to married women, it added that the employer could not seek proof beyond reasonable doubt.

In the present case, the court noted that the petitioner had lodged a complaint against Bharathi accusing him of having relationship with her on the false promise of marriage which resulted in her pregnancy. Following this, at the instance of family and well-wishers, the couple got married and photos and invitation of the same was also produced. The court noted that the Magistrate should have acted based on the material but had instead gone on to doubt the fact of pregnancy.

Adding that it was time for judicial officers to reform themselves and take a pragmatic view, the court set aside the impugned order and directed the Principal District Judge to grant maternity leave as per entitlement and to treat any leave taken by her as maternity leave.

Finding it a fit case where the petitioner must be "compensated for the mental agony suffered by her due to the unjust return of her application", the court directed the respondent-Registrar General of Madras High Court, to pay a cost of Rs.1,00,000 to the petitioner within 4 weeks.

Counsel for the Petitioner: Mr. K. Shivakumar

Counsel for the Respondents: Ms. N. K. Kanthimathi

Case Title: B Kavitha v. The Registrar General

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 116

Case No: W.P.No.6195 of 2025

Retired Employee Not Entitled To Retrospective Promotion Or Benefits Of Promotional Post After Retirement : Supreme Court

Retired Employee Not Entitled To Retrospective Promotion Or Benefits Of Promotional Post After Retirement : Supreme Court

Yash Mittal

28 Nov 2024 9:22 AM

The Supreme Court on Wednesday (Nov. 27) held that an employee whose promotion was not effectuated before his retirement would not be entitled to retrospective promotion and the notional benefits attached to the promotion.

The bench comprising Justice PS Narasimha and Justice Sandeep Mehta observed that “promotion only becomes effective upon the assumption of duties on the promotional post and not on the date of occurrence of the vacancy or the date of recommendation.”

The Bench heard the appeal filed by the State of West Bengal against the grant of notional benefits to respondent No. 1 employee, whose promotion to the post of Chief Scientific Officer (CSO) was approved post-superannuation.

The High Court approved the Administrative Tribunal decision which found that due to delay and laches on the appellant's part, respondent no.1 promotion was not effectuated before his superannuation though recommended before superannuation. Therefore, instead of directing retrospective promotion under Rule 54(1)(a) of the West Bengal Service Rules, 1971, the Tribunal directed the appellants to provide the benefits of the promotional posts.

The Supreme Court considered the question of “whether respondent No.1, who was recommended for the promotion before his retirement but did not receive actual promotion to the higher post due to administrative delays, is entitled to notional financial benefits of the promotional post after his retirement?”

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant-State Government contended that service jurisprudence does not recognize retrospective promotion without a specific enabling provision, therefore, notional promotion cannot be granted retrospectively unless there exists a specific rule or exceptional circumstances. It argued that in the present case, Rule 54(1)(a) of the West Bengal Service Rules, precludes retrospective promotion, therefore respondent no.1 would not be entitled to even notional benefits.

Finding force in the appellant's argument, the judgment authored by Justice Mehta answered the question negatively and observed that it would be unjustified to grant even a notional benefit to respondent no.1 because he had not assumed the office of the promoted position (CSO) and didn't serve in that capacity.

“promotion only becomes effective upon the assumption of duties on the promotional post and not on the date of occurrence of the vacancy or the date of recommendation. Considering that respondent No. 1 superannuated before his promotion was effectuated, he is not entitled to retrospective financial benefits associated to the promotional post of Chief Scientific Officer, as he did not serve in that capacity.”, the court said.

Reference was drawn to the case of Bihar State Electricity Board and Others v. Dharamdeo Das (2024), where the Court held that promotion is effectuated only when it is granted. The Court clarified that promotion would not be effectuated from the date when a vacancy occurs on the subject post or when the post itself is created.

The Court's reasoning was based on the fact that when the employee was not even borne in the cadre then how he can be promoted to the said cadre retrospectively.

The Court took into account Rule 54(1)(a) of the West Bengal Service Rules which prevent retrospective grant of promotion to an employee when his promotion was not even approved.

“In the instant case, it is evident that while respondent No. 1 was recommended for promotion before his retirement, he could not assume the duties of the Chief Scientific Officer. Rule 54(1)(a) of the West Bengal Service Rules, clearly stipulates that an employee must assume the responsibilities of a higher post to draw the corresponding pay, thus, preventing posthumous or retrospective promotions in the absence of an enabling provision.”, the Court said.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.

Appearance:

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Soumya Chakraborty, Sr. Adv. Ms. Astha Sharma, AOR Ms. Anju Thomas, Adv. Mr. Himanshu Chakravarty, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Nihit Nagpal, Adv. Mrs. Bindra Rana, Aor, Adv. Mr. Muneeb Rashid Malik, Adv. M/S. S. S. Rana & Co., AOR Mr. Kunal Chatterji, AOR Ms. Maitrayee Banerjee, Adv. Mr. Rohit Bansal, Adv.

Case Title: GOVERNMENT OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. VERSUS DR. AMAL SATPATHI & ORS.

Citation : 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 927

Madras High Court Imposes ₹5 Lakh Costs On State Of Tamil Nadu For “Re-Agitating” Case Which Had Already Been Decided By Supreme Court

Madras High Court Imposes ₹5 Lakh Costs On State Of Tamil Nadu For “Re-Agitating” Case Which Had Already Been Decided By Supreme Court

Upasana Sajeev

7 Mar 2025 3:06 PM




The Madras High Court recently imposed a cost of Rs. 5 Lakh on the State of Tamil Nadu for filing a writ appeal in a matter that had already attained finality through the order of the Supreme Court.

Dismissing the appeal filed by the State, Justice R Subramanian and Justice G Arul Murugan noted that the appeal was a “re-agitation” of a matter that had already been settled by a division bench of the Court and approved by the Supreme Court. Thus, the court imposed a cost directing the state to pay Rs. 2,50,000 to the sanitary worker whose appointment was challenged and the remaining Rs. 2,50,000 to be paid to the Madras High Court Legal Services Authority.

“Since we find that this appeal is re-agitation of a matter, which is already settled by a Division Bench of this Court and approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we impose cost of Rs.5,00,000/- on the Government. A cost of Rs.2,50,000/- is to be paid through the College to the person appointed as a Sanitary worker and the remaining sum of Rs.2,50,000/- shall be paid to the Madras High Court Legal Services Authority. The Government is granted four weeks time to comply with the order of the learned single Judge. Costs shall be paid within a period of 15 days from today,” the court said.

The state had filed the appeal challenging an order of the single judge approving the appointment of a Sanitary worker in St. Chritopher's College, which was a minority educational institution.

As per Rule 11(1) of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges Regulation Rules 1976, the Government was to grant aid for the appointments made by the Institution. The State, however, issued a Government Order on October 24, 2013, to fill up Group-D posts in Government Aided Arts and Science College through contractual workers in an attempt to prevent private aided colleges from making regular appointments.

When the GO was challenged, the High Court allowed the plea and quashed the GO in 2017. The Government unsuccessfully challenged the single judge's order. The division upheld the order and dismissed the appeal in 2019. The issue was also a subject matter of challenge before the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition. The SLP was dismissed by the SC in 2022, making the quashment of GO final.

In the present case, the college approached the court after the Directorate of Education failed to approve the appointment of a sanitary worker. The single judge allowed the college's plea and ordered the State to grant the approval.

Though the state relied on a single judge's order to argue that the government had a right to pass a Government Order regulating the appointment to sanctioned posts in Government aided colleges, the court noted that the single judge's order was unsustainable as it ran counter to the order already upheld by the Supreme Court. The court held that though the Government had the power to regulate appointments in Government aided Colleges, it could not be done by way of administrative order contrary to the rules already in force.

Thus, finding no merit, the court dismissed the appeal.

Counsel for the Appellant: Mr.D.Ravichander Special Government Pleader

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr.P.Godson Swaminathan for M/s.Isaac Chambers

Case Title: The State of Tamil Nadu and Others v. The Principal Secretary

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 94

Case No: W.A.No. 574 of 2025

Sending Messages 'You Look Smart, I Like You' 'To Unknown Woman Amounts To Insulting Her Modesty: Mumbai Court

Sending Messages 'You Look Smart, I Like You' 'To Unknown Woman Amounts To Insulting Her Modesty: Mumbai Court

Narsi Benwal

20 Feb 2025 9:12 PM

Sending messages like "You are slim. You look very smart. You are fair, I like you, Are you married or not?" etc to an unknown woman on WhatsApp, that too late in the night, would amount to insulting her modesty, a sessions court in Mumbai held recently while upholding the conviction of a man, who sent such objectionable messages to a former corporator.

Additional Sessions Judge DG Dhoble noted from the record that on January 26, 2016, the victim, who was then a sitting corporator from Mumabi's Borivali area, received messages - “Are you asleep? Are you married or not? You are looking smart. You are very fair. I like you. My age is 40 years. Meet you tomorrow" on her WhatsApp. The judge further noted that soon after she informed her husband and tried to call the 'unknown' number, the person who owned the said number - Narsingh Gude, did not receive the call and instead sent - “Sorry, call not accepted at night. WhatsApp chatting I like, come online” messages along with some 'obscene' photographs and messages too.

In the order passed on February 18, the judge observed that the messages and photographs were indeed 'obscene' and also noted that there was no relationship between the accused Gude and the victim or her husband, who too was a former corporator.

"No married woman or her husband, who are reputed and Corporator would bear such WhatsApp messages and obscene photos sent on her mobile in evening time from 11.00 pm to 12.30 am, especially, when there is no any relationship with sender. The alleged messages words, acts would amount to insult the modesty of women (under section 509 of the IPC)," the judge held in his order.

The court also held that the act of sending the obscene phots and the objectionable messages were sufficient for attracting punishment under sections 67 (transmission of obscene material in electronic form) and 67A (transmission of sexually explicit material in electronic form) of the Information and Technology (IT) Act.

According to the complainant, she approached the police because she felt 'ashamed' and 'outraged' after receiving those messages. However, the defence contended that no such incident took place and that the complainant and her husband had a 'political rivalry' with the accused and thus by using her 'political influence' the complainant, got a false case registered.

However, the court junked their argument. It said, "No woman would stake her dignity by implicating an accused in a false case. Therefore, the oral and documentary evidence of the complainant and her husband proves that she was received messages and obscene photographs from the accused on the relevant day."

As regards, the argument of the accused that he was not the one who sent, the judge said, "Since the appellant had exclusive knowledge of his phone's usage, he had the burden to explain how the messages originated from his number. His failure to provide any plausible explanation allows the Court to draw an adverse inference. The sender's identity is not automatically presumed but is established through circumstantial evidence, documentary proof and adverse inference under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act which is duly established by the prosecution."

Therefore, the court upheld the three months simple imprisonment imposed upon Gude and the fine amounts.

With these observations, the court dismissed the appeal filed by Gude against his conviction and sentence by a Metropolitan Magistrate Court in Borivali.

Appearance:

Advocate Ninad Muzumdar appeared for the Appellant.

Additional Public Prosecutor Mahajan represented the State.

Case Title: Narsingh Gude vs State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal 272 of 2022)

Important MCQs Based On Latest Supreme Court Judgments For Law Examinations

Important MCQs Based On Latest Supreme Court Judgments For Law Examinations

Yash Mittal

15 Feb 2025 2:26 PM

Live Law brings to you interesting questions on recent important Supreme Court Judgments for judicial services and other law competitive examinations. Here are the ten most important questions :

Q 1. Under Article 22(1) of the Indian Constitution, what constitutes proper compliance with the requirement to inform an arrested person of the grounds of their arrest?

A) Informing the arrestee's relative about the arrest and its reasons.

B) Recording the reasons for arrest in the arrest memo, remand report, or case diary.

C) Personally and effectively communicating the grounds of arrest to the arrestee.

D) Providing the grounds of arrest in a later court hearing.

Answer: Option (C)

Case Title: VIHAAN KUMAR Versus THE STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR, Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169

Explanation: The Supreme Court has clarified that merely informing a relative or recording the grounds in official documents does not fulfill the constitutional mandate under Article 22(1). The arrested person must be directly informed of the grounds of arrest in a clear and effective manner.

Q 2. Decide when a repealing Act is not required to obtain fresh Presidential Assent under Article 254 of the Constitution.

A) When the original Act had received Presidential Assent, and the repealing Act alters the law significantly.

B) When the repealing Act is intended to correct flaws in the old law without contradicting prior judicial rulings.

C) When the repealing Act establishes an entirely new legal framework in place of the old law.

D) When the original Act was a Central law, and the repealing Act is passed by a State Legislature.

Answer: Option (B)

Case Title: M/S S.R.S. TRAVELS BY ITS PROPRIETOR K.T. RAJASHEKAR VERSUS THE KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION WORKERS & ORS, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 166

Explanation: The Supreme Court clarified that a repealing Act does not require fresh Presidential Assent if it falls within the legislative competence of the State and is meant to rectify the shortcomings of the prior law rather than introducing a new legal framework. The mere fact that the original Act had Presidential Assent does not automatically mandate the same for the repealing Act.

Q 3. A woman, without obtaining a formal divorce from her first husband, marries a second time with a man who is fully aware of her first marriage. They live together, have a child, and later separate due to disputes. The woman seeks maintenance under Section 125 CrPC from her second husband. The second husband opposes the claim, arguing that she is not legally his "wife" as her first marriage was never legally dissolved. Decide whether the woman can claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC from her second husband.

A) The woman is not entitled to maintenance as her second marriage is void due to the subsistence of her first marriage.

B) The woman is entitled to maintenance since her second husband knew about her first marriage and lived with her as husband and wife.

C) The woman can claim maintenance only if she proves that her first husband is unable to provide for her.

D) The second husband is liable for maintenance only if he legally adopted their child.

Answer: Option (B)

Case Title: SMT. N. USHA RANI AND ANR. VERSUS MOODUDULA SRINIVAS, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 156

Explanation: The Supreme Court ruled that a woman is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. from her second husband, even if her first marriage was not legally dissolved. The Court clarified that a formal decree of dissolution is not mandatory. If the woman and her first husband mutually agreed to separate, the absence of a legal divorce does not prevent her from seeking maintenance from her second husband.

Q 4. Flat purchasers challenged the builder's forfeiture of 20% of the basic sale price as earnest money as per the Apartment Buyer Agreement (ABA) following their cancellation of the flat booking. They contended that the 20% forfeiture was arbitrary and excessive amounting to a penalty for 'breach of contract' under Section 74 of the Contract Act. Decide the most appropriate option.

A) Forfeiture of earnest money is always considered a penalty, regardless of the amount.

B) Any forfeiture of more than 10% of the BSP is deemed excessive and arbitrary.

C) Earnest money can be forfeited, but the amount must not be so excessive that it becomes a penalty for a breach of contract.

D) The Apartment Buyer Agreement (ABA) did not mention any forfeiture clause, making the builder's claim invalid.

Answer: Option (C)

Case Title: GODREJ PROJECTS DEVELOPMENT LIMITED VERSUS ANIL KARLEKAR & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 150

Explanation: The Supreme Court held that while forfeiture of reasonable earnest money is permissible, it must not be excessive or punitive under Section 74 of the Contract Act. In this case, the Court ruled that 20% forfeiture of the BSP was excessive and amounted to a penalty, while 10% was reasonable and enforceable. The Court emphasized that forfeiture should act as a security for contract performance, not as a punitive measure.

Q 5. It is a settled proposition of law that a Magistrate should not mechanically order an FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC without judicial application of mind. Under the newly introduced Section 175(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, what additional safeguards have been introduced before a Magistrate can direct the registration of an FIR?

A) The complainant must submit an affidavit and a copy of their application to the Superintendent of Police if their FIR is refused.

B) The Magistrate must conduct a preliminary inquiry before ordering an FIR.

C) The Magistrate must consider the police officer's reasons for refusing to register the FIR before passing an order.

D) All of the above.

Answer: Option (D)

Case Title: OM PRAKASH AMBADKAR VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Explanation: The Court highlighted three new safeguards in BNSS Section 175(3) [absent in Cr.P.C. 156(3)]: 1) mandatory application to the Superintendent of Police (with copy and affidavit); 2) Magistrate's power of inquiry; and 3) consideration of the police's refusal to register the FIR. These codify existing safeguards against misuse of magisterial powers.

Q 6. An incident happened inside the private chamber of the Revenue Inspector-complainant in the government office, where the accused upon knowing the caste of the complainant remarked “if you people are appointed in Government service you all will do like this only…”. Thereafter, he scolded the complainant calling his caste name, and insulted him using vulgar words. Following the incident, other colleagues of the complainant came, pacified the accused, and took him away. Decide whether the act of the accused would be covered under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

A) Yes, there was caste-based abuse as the accused abused the complainant in front of the complainant's colleague coming within the public view.

B) No, because no one was present when the accused abused the complainant inside the four walls of his private chamber.

C) The act of the accused abusing the complainant in his caste name was done privately not qualifying the public view.

D). Both (B) and (C)

Answer: Option (D)

Case Title: Karuppudayar v. State, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 133

Explanation: The Supreme Court ruled that for an offense under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) to be made out, caste-based abuse must occur in public view. If the abuse happens inside a private office or chamber, where no public members are present, it does not constitute an offense under the SC/ST Act. The Court referenced Swaran Singh v. State (2008) and Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand (2020) to clarify that public accessibility is essential for such offenses.

Q 7. X and Y have been legally married since 2010. In 2020, Y gave birth to a child. X suspects that he is not the biological father because Y had an extramarital affair during the time of conception. X files a petition challenging the paternity of the child and requests a DNA test to prove his claim. Y argues that, under the law, the child is presumed to be X's legitimate offspring. As per Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, which of the following is correct regarding Aman's claim?

A) Aman can rebut the presumption of paternity by proving Y's extramarital affair, as it raises suspicion about the child's parentage.

B) The presumption that X is the father can only be rebutted if he provides conclusive proof that he had no access to Y during the time of conception, making it impossible for him to be the father.

C) X has an absolute right to demand a DNA test since the child's paternity is in question, and mere suspicion is sufficient for the court to allow it.

D) Since Y had an affair, the child is automatically considered illegitimate unless X accepts the paternity voluntarily.

Correct Answer: Option (B)

Case Title: Ivan Rathinam versus Milan Joseph, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118

Explanation: The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a child's legitimacy determines paternity, emphasizing that a child born during a valid marriage is presumed to be the legitimate offspring of parents who had access to each other at the time of conception. The Court dismissed the argument that legitimacy and paternity are distinct concepts requiring separate determination. It held that legitimacy and paternity are inherently intertwined, as the legitimacy of a child directly establishes paternity. The Court clarified that if it is proven that the married couple had access to each other at the time of the child's conception, the child is deemed legitimate, thereby establishing the paternity of the couple.

Q 8. X agrees to sell his property to Y in January 2023 but later refuses, prompting Y to sue for specific performance. While the suit is pending, X sells the property to Z in May 2024. Unaware of the litigation, Z seeks impleadment, which the trial court rejects. Z appeals, and the High Court grants leave. Can Z, whose impleadment was denied, challenge the trial court's decree favoring Y by appealing to the High Court, claiming adverse effects on his rights?

A) Z, as a pendente lite transferee, has an absolute right to be impleaded in the suit under Order I Rule 10 CPC.

B) The High Court correctly allowed Z's appeal because a pendente lite transferee is not bound by the decree if he was not made a party to the suit.

C) The High Court erred, as Z had no automatic right to be impleaded in the suit, and he is bound by the outcome of the litigation under Section 52 Transfer of Property Act.

D) Z can avoid the effects of lis pendens (pending litigation) by proving that he was unaware of the suit at the time of purchase.

Answer: Option (C)

Case Title: Case Title: H. ANJANAPPA & ORS. VERSUS A. PRABHAKAR & ORS, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Explanation: The Supreme Court ruled that a pendente lite transferee (someone who purchases a suit property during the pendency of the litigation) has no automatic right to be impleaded in a suit. It said only in exceptional cases, where the transferee's rights are adversely affected or jeopardized, a leave would be granted to the pendente lite transferee (who wasn't impleaded in the suit) to appeal against the decree.

In this case, the transfer of the suit property to Z occurred during the ongoing suit and was subject to the case's outcome under Section 52 TPA. Since the trial court ruled against him, he cannot be considered adversely affected, entitling them to leave to appeal without being impleaded in the suit.

Q 9. W is accused of murdering his neighbor, Z. The police arrested W and during interrogation, he disclosed the location of the alleged murder weapon, a knife hidden in his garden shed. The knife is recovered based on his statement. At trial, the prosecution's case rests solely on W's disclosure statement and the recovery of the knife. There are no eyewitnesses, and no other evidence linking W to the crime. W argued that the disclosure statement alone is insufficient for a conviction. Decide.

A) W's conviction should be upheld, as the disclosure statement and recovery of the weapon are sufficient evidence.

B) The conviction should be overturned, as a disclosure statement alone, without corroborating evidence, is insufficient for conviction.

C) The trial court should conduct a fresh trial, allowing the prosecution to gather additional evidence.

D) The admissibility of the disclosure statement depends on whether W confessed voluntarily.

Answer: Option (B)

Case Title: Vinobhai versus State of Kerala, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 127

Explanation: The Supreme Court stated that a disclosure statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act unaccompanied by the supporting evidence is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court reasoned that the conviction cannot be solely based on the disclosure statement because it is considered a weak piece of evidence.

Q 10. A intends to kill B due to a long-standing enmity. One night, he enters B's house and, in the darkness, mistakenly stabs C, B's brother, who dies on the spot. A argues in his defense that he never intended to harm C and should not be held liable for his death. Based on the doctrine of "transmigration of motive" under Section 301 of the IPC, how should the court decide A's liability?

A) A is not guilty, as he did not intend to kill C.

B) A is guilty of murder under Section 302 IPC, as the intention to kill B is transferred to C under Section 301 IPC.

C) A is guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC.

D) A is guilty only of causing grievous hurt, as he did not specifically target C.

Answer: Option (B)

Case Title: Case Name: ASHOK SAXENA v. THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND ETC. Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 163

Explanation: The Supreme Court recently observed that Section 301 of the IPC (Culpable homicide by causing the death of a person other than the person whose death was intended) reflects the doctrine of transfer of malice or the transmigration of motive. Explaining this provision, the Court said that culpable homicide may be committed even if the offender causes the death of a person he did not intend. Provided that the killing takes place while doing an act which the offender intended.